Reading of Arendt and Giovanni

Tilda Sutter

Professor Ellis Neyra

ENGL 320

November 16, 2024

Selamawit Terrefe, in her essay, “Death Rattles not Dashikis”, investigates Hannah Arendt’s assertions about the constitutional qualities of humanness – arguing that these requirements illuminate the paradoxical creation of nonbeings, the figure of the Slave. Terrefe references Arendt’s The Human Condition; below, I have expanded a passage Terrefe annotates, continuing to probe Arendt’s work within the context of Terrefe’s uncoverings.   

“Speech and action reveal this unique distinctness. Through them, men distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct; they are the modes in which human beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects, but qua men. This appearance, as distinguished from mere bodily existence, rests on initiative, but it is an initiative from which no human being can refrain and still be human. This is true of no other activity in the vita activa. Men can very well live without laboring, they can force others to labor for them, and they can very well decide merely to use and enjoy the world of things without themselves adding a single useful object to it; the life of an exploiter or slaveholder and the life of a parasite may be unjust, but they certainly are human. A life without speech and without action, on the other hand – and this is the only way of life that in earnest has renounced all appearance and vanity in the biblical sense of the word – is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men” (Arendt, 176). 

Arendt traces the foundational quality of man as “speech and action”. These conditions allow men to “distinguish themselves” instead of being “merely distinct”; therefore, the conditio sine qua non of humanity is not a “[distinctness]”, but the ability to create this quality of distinctiveness, an ability to “distinguish [oneself]”. The inclusion of this “[mere]” distinction points to the possibility of a non-being; something that simultaneously belongs within the world of the “[distinguished]” yet is excluded from its capabilities. Similarly, her emphasis on the possibility of creating distinction, as the requirement of existence, reiterates her claims about “speech and action” – there is no obligation of creation within the world of beings, solely the ability, whether dormant or not, to generate. These inoperative beings are characterized as such, unlike the alluded to non-beings, who operate in a form of social death. 

This ability to  distinguish allows men to “appear to each other”, not as “physical objects” but as “qua men”. Without speech and action, within Arendt’s formulation, men are invisible. This invisibility is applied to her implicit creation of non-beings – those perpetually understood as obscure, unseeable, unknowable, never in existence at all. However, paradoxically, these non-beings seem to appear, solely as “physical objects”. The reference to a non-being that materializes as a “physical object” seems to be an unintentional illusion to the Middle Passage – Slaves, who while anthropomorphic, present as objects for the unending use of beings. These Slaves are excluded from appearing as “qua men”, lacking the prerequisite for representation – defined as speech and action. Slaves therefore occupy two irreconcilable modes of visibility; materializing as “physical objects” and simultaneously nothing at all. 

Arendt continues to write “this appearance, as distinguished from mere bodily existence”, unintentionally revealing the true conditio sine qua non of being, of life, of the World. Appearance, or being, is created through the “[distinction]” from “mere bodily existence”; life created from the inverted production of the Slave – the Slave as genesis for the Human. However, she continues to offer another origin for existence –“initiative”. Like her discussion of the qualities of speech and action, “initiative” does not require a completed operation for its application. Instead, it is a dormant prerequisite of all humans, creating a caste of humanity that is not contingent on action or success, but rather, a separation from the Slave. Similarly, “no human being can refrain” from initiative “and still be human”; another illusion to the paradoxical nonexistence of the figure of the Slave, defined here as those who “refrain” from initiative, and are therefore inhuman. Initiative is the sole requirement of inclusion within the “vita activa”, political life, or the World. 

Arendt continues with a list of actions characteristic of the human, yet none the conditio sine qua non of humanity itself; “Men can very well live without laboring, they can force others to labor for them, and they can very well decide merely to use and enjoy the world of things without themselves adding a single useful object to it”. Above, Arendt again revokes a foundational power from the work of “labor” and “adding” “useful [objects]” to the “world of things”, reiterating that only the basest form of initiative creates the category of a human – the generative conclusion to that quality is irrelevant. She invokes man’s ability to “force others to labor for them” – which while possibly alluding to a form of involuntary labor, does not refer to the enslavement of the Middle Passage. Crucially, those who are forced to labor are “others”, and therefore are beings included within the World, regardless of their different status. This position of the Other is distinct from that of the Slave – as the Slave, while constituted of and for the World, is not an existent member of it. However, Arendt’s assertion that men can “decide merely to use and enjoy the world of things” is where the position of the Slave is unearthed – Slaves are what are “merely [used]” and “[enjoyed]” within the “world of things”. This “use” is both physical and symbolic; the figure of the Slave functions as an endlessly plyable void for the world of beings. 

Arendt directly discusses a position of enslavement; “the life of an exploiter or slaveholder and the life of a parasite may be unjust, but they certainly are human”. Above, she reasserts the humanity of a “slaveholder”, a notable affirmation considering her inability to investigate the violences that create this category of being. This “slaveholder” is compared to a “parasite”; both reliant on the “[parasitic]” use of another form for their own existence – an apt but unintentional metaphor for the position of the Slave as genesis for that of man. 

Subsequently, Arendt reinstates her prerequisites for human existence; “a life without speech and without action, on the other hand… is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men”. Again, a “life without speech and without action” is defined as the position of the Slave – incapable of action due to its preordained natal alienation and noncontingent violences. Therefore, the Slave is “literally dead to the world”, nonexisting in a form of social death. This non-being does not “[live] among men”, as it does not meet the prerequisite qualities of appearance, defined earlier as speech and action.

Arendt’s formulation of the conditio sine qua non of humanity inadvertently reveals its founding genesis, the paradoxical, accompanying, inverted creation of the Slave. She outlines the conditions of this non-being, an inability to speak, act, or exist within the vita activa. These figures, therefore, are resigned to a perpetual, preordained social death – serving as the constituting force of the World and Being, yet excluded from both.  

Work Cited

Selamawit Terrefe. "Death Rattle Not Dashikis" Philosophy Today, vol. 64, no. 4, 2023, pp.

773-793

Giovanni, Nikki. "The Great Pax Whitie." Poetry Foundation,

https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/48221/the-great-pax-whitie. Accessed 16 November 2024.

Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. 2nd ed., University of Chicago Press, 1998.


sketch.io




 this was made by the same people who made agar.io, slither.io.. etc. It's called sketch.io

Gheaus & Gender Identity

Cora-Louise Fleming-Benite

PHI 210 - Feminist Political Philosophy 



Anca Gheaus & Gender Identity 

In this paper, I present and argue against philosopher Anca Gheaus’ eliminativist theories on gender identity, presented in her paper “Feminism without “gender identity.”” Ultimately, Gheaus underestimates the extent to which people care about identity, which is evidenced in her inaccurate judgment of what is feasible and in her premature dismissal of the aspirational gender role theory of gender identity.


Gheaus’ Argument

To make her argument, Gheaus cites a definition of feminism that describes the feminist project’s aims as eliminating unjustified gender norms and mitigating, or compensating, the disadvantages generated by these norms. With these aims in mind, Gheaus explains, it is essential to distinguish between justified and unjustified gender norms, so as to determine which norms are to be eliminated. Gheaus defines gender roles as “comprehensive social roles that define, for their occupants, different virtues, vices, social rewards and sanctions, and set expectations about who should perform which kind of socially useful work” (37). She describes justified gender norms as ones that derive from facts about sexual characteristics– these are norms pertaining to, for instance, medical care. Gheaus proposes that, instead of referring to these as justified gender norms, we should instead call them “norms related to sexual characteristics.” 

Gheaus defines unjustified norms as “sui generis gender norms,” explaining that these norms categorize people into gender roles and define the content of these roles. Sui generis gender norms are understood to be bad for several reasons. Gheaus cites the feminist objections to sui generis gender norms, notably that such norms enforce different treatment of people based on their real or perceived male or female sexual characteristics. This differential creates expectations of what it means to be a “good female human being” or a “good male human being,” putting people in boxes and requiring that “our judgment of individuals’ virtues and vices be dependent on the gender role they occupy” (38), creating a double standard. Some norms license behavior that is morally wrong (eg. toxic masculinity), others make an asymmetrical demand for morally praiseworthy behavior (eg that a woman be nurturing, or a man protective), while others pertain to morally neutral behavior. 

Another feminist objection to sui generis gender norms is that they are inegalitarian, as they have, historically, unfairly hindered women: “Their access to important opportunities, their freedom from domination, marginalisation and exploitation, and often their very agency, safety and life have been compromised by gender norms” (38). 

Gheaus objects to viewing sui generis gender norms as wholly inegalitarian by presenting a final issue with these norms: they unnecessarily stunt individuals’ development. She distinguishes this issue with that of inequality in that these norms negatively impact everyone’s wellbeing, including that of men, meaning that “gender norms do not always, and therefore not necessarily, generate a unidirectional system of oppression of women in the service of men’s interests” (38). She concludes, therefore, that these norms are not objectionable because they are inegalitarian. Instead, she describes these norms as objectionable because they limit the development of all people, regardless of gender, preventing them from pursuing a good life free from arbitrary constraints. 

Gheaus also believes that gender identity should be abolished because there is no available definition of gender identity that fulfills every desiderata – features deemed important (outlined by trans writers as well) – of the term. Gheaus lists these desiderata saying that (1) the concept should vindicate trans people’s identification of their own identities, (2) the concept should allow for privileged access to one’s gender identity, (3) everyone should have a gender identity, (4) the concept should sit well with the claim that denying a person’s gender identity/misgendering them is a grave harm, (5) the concept should be such that people have a claim against others to respect gender identifications, and (6) it must sometimes be permissible for various institutions to require information about one’s gender identity. Gheaus then examines 6 different candidate concepts of gender identity: Gender identity1 as (lack of) conformity with behavior and dispositions typical of one’s sex, gender identity2 as (dis)comfort with one’s sexed body, gender identity3 as assigned gender role, gender identity4 as aspirational gender role, gender identity5 as internalised gender norms, and gender identity6 as endorsed gender norms. 

According to a fourth proposal, gender identity is defined as the gender norms that a person wishes that others applied to them – that is, one’s aspirational gender role. “Gender identity4 consists in identification with a social role, and maybe also with others who occupy that role,” (42) explains Gheaus. By this definition, people have authority of their own gender identity, thus fulfilling desiderata 2, as it allows for privileged access to one’s gender identity. Gender identity4 also provides a basis for the importance that trans women place on being included in women’s spaces. Gheaus also outlines several shortcomings for this concept of gender identity. Some people do not want any gender norms applied to them, meaning that some people would lack a gender identity, failing desiderata 3. Gheaus also objects to gender identity4 arguing that, since gender norms, which form the basis of gender roles, are unjustified, one cannot claim a right to a specific gender identity. Instead, we may have a general duty not to categorize others as either male or female. When someone consents to gendered treatment based on their aspirational gender role, this duty may not apply, and they may not be wronged. However, Gheaus argues “consent is insufficient to make the treatment permissible, if holding people to particular sets of unjustified gender norms reinforces the norms and therefore creates negative externalities” (42). Therefore, gender identity cannot justify a duty to treat individuals according to specific gender norms, which should be rejected altogether.

Gheaus addresses potential worries or objections with her view. The first objection Gheaus discusses is one she calls the “feasibility worry.” This objection argues that “the gender aspect of our identities is so foundational that we cannot navigate the social world without it” (46). Gheaus discusses Charlotte Witt’s view that “gender roles are the metaphysical unifier of our social identities and are therefore essential to them” (46), believing that all other aspects of social identity are secondary. This may mean that it would be impossible to make sense of the social world without gender roles. Gheaus counters this objection in two ways, first, by arguing that considering gender as a unifier for aspects of our social identities does not apply to any one aspect of our identity – saying that Witt’s view overstates the extent to which gender is in fact a unique unifier. Gheaus argues that gender may not always be the most important aspect of a person's identity, as its relevance is context-dependent. Using the example of Ana, a Russian serf, Gheaus suggests that different parts of Ana’s identity—being a woman, a serf, or Russian—are emphasized depending on the social situation. To her fellow peasants, she is primarily a woman, to the landowners, a serf, and to people in a foreign country, a Russian. 

Gheaus also counters the feasibility worry by citing historical examples of other identities that were once believed to be essential for understanding and organizing perceptions of the social world, have diminished or become less significant over time (counter 2). Around two hundred years ago, Gheaus explains, many Europeans viewed “nationality” as the primary identity category – or at least one of the most central identity categories. Today, though, we are more easily able to perceive people without relying on nationality. “Possibly the same will be true one day of gender identities,” (47) resolves Gheaus. 

Gheaus addresses a second potential objection, one she refers to as the “desirability worry.” That is to say, without an account of gender identity, therefore eliminating the possibility of clearly defining who is a woman and who is a man, feminism is unable to pursue its aims. “‘Feminism’ is most widely understood as a movement aiming to overcome the oppression of women,” (47) she explains. Readers may worry: without the ability to determine what is a woman, what will become of the feminist project? Gheaus counters this objection by proposing a different definition of feminism, one that doesn’t require agreement on what – or who – a woman is (counter 3). She defines the feminist project as “the elimination of gender norms and the mitigation or compensation of disadvantages generated by such norms” (48), allowing for the furthering of feminist aims without the reliance on concepts of gender identity. 


My Objections

I took issue with Gheaus’ objections to the aspirational gender role theory of gender identity (gender identity4). Gheaus makes a big empirical claim – that treating people, with their consent, according to their aspired gender role reinforces unjustified gender norms and thus creates negative externalities – without citing any evidence. Without substantiation, I find this argument difficult to accept. As Gheaus herself describes, gender identity4 succeeds in many ways in terms of trans inclusivity. Employing a concept of gender identity that is trans inclusive subverts traditional and restrictive notions of gender, therefore asserting that treating someone, with their consent, based on their aspired gender roles, does not necessarily propagate gender norms. Additionally, even if we were to accept Gheaus’ claim, she’s weighing larger social issues about the perception of gender above the personal wellbeing of trans people, which I feel that Gheaus does not have the authority to do, nor has she provided sufficient evidence to make me comfortable with this value judgment. 

I also believe that Gheaus fails to adequately address the feasibility worry. While she is right in that some social identities that were once central to our understanding of the social world have become more marginal, her counter remains largely unconvincing. Yes, in Europe of the 1700s, nationality was a central identity category, but so was gender. Gender cannot be compared to other identities because there has yet to be a historical period, in which it is ignored. It is not as though gender simply happens to be in favor as a method of social categorisation, one that will become marginal in the way that nationality did. Gender has always been central, perhaps anchoring other identities that are central – alongside gender – depending on the context. This also applies to Gheaus’ argument that there is no unique aspect of our identity, metaphysically unifying all of our social identities. It is true that some aspects of our identity are more or less salient depending on context, but gender is different from such aspects in that it remains relevant across contexts. If for instance, an individual immigrated, it is possible that their race or class may become more or less relevant than it was in their original context. In their new context, though, they would remain constrained, defined, or potentially liberated because of gender identity. They will still be subjected to gender norms, and while those may differ from context to context, they remain rooted in their gender identity, whether real or perceived. I accept that my point about the persistent relevance of gender would need far more evidence, and perhaps does not apply when discussing single gender spaces; it is not sufficient to object to Gheaus’ counter. Even so, if gender did become less central to our societal understanding of identity– just as nationality did– this would be a long process, not feasible in someone’s immediate lifetime. As gender remains central, people will continue to be subjected to gender norms. Our concept of gender identity provides a basis for efforts to mitigate this suffering, by, for instance, compelling individuals and institutions to use someone’s desired pronouns, or allowing trans people into gendered spaces, regardless of their sex or perceived gender; it is worth preserving. 


Word count: 1931

I pledge my honor that this paper represents my own work in accordance with University regulations /Cora-Louise Fleming-Benite/

Interrogating Booth's Concept of the Implied Author

B- paper, but it's been too long since I've posted on this blog so I'm posting this.


When viewers identify with a singular point of view or voice in a film, there is a potential for destructive misreadings and misinterpretations. I will outline how Booth addresses this problem by proposing the existence of an “implied author,” or creative center. I then argue that Wilson’s discussion of the theory of perceptual extension and his examination of Fritz Lang’s You Only Live Once disproves Booth’s concept of the implied author. 


1. Booth

As Booth explains, the case for a single creating author in films is very weak, as every film results from countless voices– including that of the script writer, director, producers, editors, actors, and that of chance, at times. Despite this multiplicity of voices, Booth argues, every successful film has an “implied author.” Booth describes this implied author as “a creative voice uniting all of the choices” (Booth 2002, 125). This voice will always differ from what any one member of the crew would have created, but still provides the viewer with a unified center. 

Booth explains that even in movies that are confusing, in which it may be hard to pick out a unified voice, the effect of the confusion is evidence that the confusion was deliberate, therefore that all of the voices and contributors to the movie have agreed to a single direction– that direction being, to confuse the viewer. 

Booth uses director Sam Mendes’ American Beauty to exemplify the need for, and the presence of, the implied author. From Allan Ball’s, the movie’s author, original script, the film seems to be a commentary on “‘how the world sucks’” (Booth 2002, 128). However, after the changes made, not only by the director, but by choices made by actors, cinematography, musical score, etc, the film’s actual theme is debated, and much harder to grasp. Booth says that misinterpretations of American Beauty result from an “uncritical identification with this or that explicit voice” (Booth 2002, 129), which might be, for instance, identification with one of the film’s characters. Booth says that such interpretations lack a search for the film’s slippery center, “a center where each voice is in effect criticized or modified by the other voices” (Booth 2002, 129). He explains that the center of a film as powerful as American Beauty cannot be adequately formulated with words but instead lies “in the creative energy that hundreds of people put into its production, agreeing and disagreeing, inserting and cutting” (Booth 2002, 129). 


2. Wilson 

 In his paper “Film, Perception, and Point of View,” philosopher George Wilson describes how point of view is determined and understood in film and how this impacts what exactly film represents, as it pertains to reality. Wilson examines what he calls the “theory of perceptual extension,” which explains that film presents or reveals things, events, or aspects of them that people often overlook or perceive without fully appreciating their potential human significance. This theory also says that film grants us perceptual access to patterns of sensible phenomena that hold natural significance, and that are rarely perceived in their entirety by individual observers. Film captures the entirety of these patterns, presenting them in a clear, structured way, making them accessible for continuous, conscious understanding. In doing so, film connects us to the perceptual foundations of the natural significance we attribute to the world around us. The theory of perceptual extension proposes that film allows us to pick out only the relevant phenomena and assemble them into a meaningful and unified pattern through the fictional world in which we are immersed, and through photographic and editing techniques that allow for a visual record of the fictional course of events.  

However, as Wilson points out (in describing Bazin’s view), the theory of perceptual extension requires a specific, analytical style of filmmaking to perform the aesthetic functions it describes. The style is intentionally crafted to reflect the theory’s assumptions. Bazin argues that these assumptions, and their corresponding style, are not essential for creating a successful and meaningful film. Analytical editing has the power to assign psychological meaning to an ambiguous facial expression, as proved by the Kuleshov experiment. This then means that, to preserve our perception of the expression’s ambiguity, perhaps analytical editing should be avoided. Just as the visual techniques of film have the power to extract real meaning that we might not otherwise recognize, it has the power to distort meaning, providing an inaccurate representation, assigning meaning to genuine ambiguity. Bazin therefore concludes that film does not make sense out of reality’s ambiguity, as the theory of perceptual extension might suggest, but simply reflects this ambiguity. 

A film can embody certain aesthetic assumptions while simultaneously subjecting them to critical scrutiny. To exemplify this, Wilson discusses Fritz Lang’s 1936 movie, You Only Live Once. In this film, viewers are at once subjected — thanks to narrative choices – to the ‘fictional society’ within the film’s biases. People view Eddie as guilty, perhaps unfairly. OK, so, in employing the theory of perceptual extension, one might interpret this film as clarifying a phenomenon that happens in reality: people unfairly being viewed as guilty, a phenomenon that we may not usually recognize, but are now able to thanks to the way in which the film extracts and presents patterns. The film complicates this, though, by excluding as much vital information as it includes. This is exemplified, for instance, when the bank robbery is shown; viewers are provided with specific details, in line with the usual analytic attention to specifics, but are prevented from seeing who exactly is committing the crime. This is not just for the sake of suspense and irony, Wilson continues, as the film signals much perceptual manipulation, questioning the reality of the information that is included. 

Ultimately, what Wilson’s analysis of You Only Live Once demonstrates, is that neither society – the one presented in the film – nor the viewer is in a position to know the truth about Eddie’s innocence or guilt. Both points of view are influenced by deliberate perceptual factors. This means that the suggested interpretation of narrative that we get from film can be false. 

While Wilson’s views seem to demonstrate Booth’s warning that viewing a film from one point of view or another can lead to severe misinterpretations, I believe that Wilson’s arguments undermine Booth’s concept of the implied author. There are two potential creative centers of the film, neither of which are abandoned so as to unite with the other. Both voices are distinct and neither are resolved, meaning that this film fails to present an implied author or unified voice. Lang’s film presents multiple equally valid interpretations, uses analytical style to both establish and undermine meaning, and resists resolving into any single “correct” reading. Booth may respond to this by saying that the film’s creative center is deliberate confusion, that “a group of voices have finally surrendered to one another in a single direction” (Booth 2002, 126), that singular direction being confusion. I think, however, that You Only Live Once does not demonstrate deliberate confusion, but genuine ambiguity. Neither point of view is surrendered or resolved. Both are carried through to the end. While deliberate ambiguity, perhaps like in the film Run Lola Run, as Booth says, has a unified purpose in making viewers feel uncertain, the genuine ambiguity Wilson presents questions the very possibility of unified purpose. Deliberate confusion can ultimately be understood as serving an artistic goal, whereas genuine ambiguity remains fundamentally unresolvable. 

Wilson shows that films can create multiple contradictory interpretations, undermine their own apparent messages, and question their own reliability as narrators. Under Wilson’s view, films can reflect the inherent uncertainty of perception rather than impose a unified vision, and Booth’s implied author view does. The potential for perceptual manipulation in film itself questions the possibility of unified authorial voice. Under Wilson’s interpretations, meaning emerges from the interaction between the viewer and film rather than from an implied center. This allows for the viewer to make the film, rather than simply the film making the viewer. 


Text, Image, and Structure in Meador's Artist Book Memory Lapse

 1. Clifton Meador’s Memory Lapse


Clifton Meador’s book Memory Lapse is a photographic documentation of the past and present of the Solovetsky Monastery located on the Solovetsky Islands in the White Sea in northern Russia. Furthermore, Memory Lapse is an exploration of how the physicality and sequential nature of the book can be exploited to enrich and complicate the reader’s engagement with memory and history. Memory Lapse was published by Nexus Press in 1999. From 1977 to 2003, Nexus Press operated out of Atlanta, Georgia and was devoted to the production and publication of experimental artist books. Because Nexus Press received significant portions of their funding from state and federal organizations, the initiative fell prey to changing, anti-art politics in the early 2000s. Much of the organization’s information has since been wiped from public memory and documentation, and thus it is unclear how many copies of Memory Lapse had been printed. Meador has stated, though, that Memory Lapse exists in one printed edition, and that some of the books have since been scattered around academic institutions, and art museums and archives around the world. 

Meador’s Memory Lapse features a combination of text and printed images. The text ranges from poems to historical writings. The images are all photographs, mostly of the monastery, and some of historical documents or painted representations of the space. The book is 129 pages, constructed from 24 paper octavos which were bound using smyth sewing into a hardcover binder. Sewn onto the outside of the binder is a maroon cloth, and pasted onto the inside are orange endsheets made of paper. These orange sheets of paper conceal the material of the book’s binder, and also separate the hard cover from the printed material of the book. Unlike the rest of the color in the book which has been printed, the orange color of these endsheets seems to have dyed into the paper. 

The material of the binder is never visible. The binder is covered by the orange sheets and a maroon cloth. Furthermore, the maroon cloth is also not visible without the intentional removal of Memory Lapse’s dust jacket. The book’s dust jacket features a printed image of the outside of the Solovetsky Monastery which wraps around the front and back of the book. On the front cover of the dust jacket the title of the book has also been printed. Both the photograph and the title were printed using duotone offset lithography printing. The rest of the book’s linguistic and bibliographic/graphic coding also uses printing methods of duotone offset lithography, as well as tritone and four-color offset lithography printing. Offset lithography printing involves the transferring of graphic codes from one inked surface, to another blank surface, before printing the marks onto the final sheet. This differs from other popular forms of printing where marks are printed directly from an inked plate onto the final sheet. 


2. Meador’s and Artists’ Use of the Book -


The bibliographic codes of Memory Lapse are difficult to synthesize. Meador’s use of printed type and photographs is not limited to the cover; the printed marks on the pages of Memory Lapse also exist as text/type and images. Both written literature and photographs do not fundamentally root their expression or distribution in the medium of the codex. Especially in the late 90s, these forms of artistic expression do not need to utilize the codex to find audiences. At the time of Memory Lapse’s publication, in 1999, images and writing could interact with viewers through curated instillations, individual photographic or mixed media prints, and, especially–considering artists’ books’ desire for holistic intentionality of craftsmanship through the artistic control of all parts of the book-making process, from curation, to design, to publishing–through the internet. We must, then, consider the codex medium to be a highly intentional choice on the part of Meador, and question what is to be gained from the utilization of, and possibly even exploitation of, the form?

In a 1997 essay, Johanna Drucker discusses how making printed books, but more specifically artists’ books, in an increasingly digital age reflects an extremely deliberate choice of the part of a bookmaker/artist. This choice comes from a need not only to express a particular content, but to do so in self-conscious, meta-conversation with the physicality of a medium. Drucker, writing in close temporal proximity to the creation of Memory Lapse, discusses how the transition from print to digital media resembles a similar shift from manuscript to print culture. Early typefaces attempted to resemble handwriting and familiar aesthetics before developing distinct material, visual languages to subconsciously influence the production of meaning from their (biblio)graphic codes. Drucker argues that in the 1990s digital media attempted to translate content from physical, printed medium online, but “such simulacral mimeses seem likely to be shortlived–the process of manipulating independent units of text or image within the newly discrete bounded spaces of an electronic file will develop their own aesthetic, and these quotations of form will seem as quaint as the ductal patterns of the early typefaces that copied the characteristics of the penstrokes into the resisting material of hard metal.” For mixed media artists working at the end of the 20th century, the choice to engage with the medium of the Book rather than attempt to develop a digital, material language reveals something about how the bibliographic properties of a book–sequence, choice of paper, page openings, text, color, typography, to name a few–are valuable and can be exploited to expand and deepen meaning that is produced from and in conversation with a(n artists’) book’s printed graphic and linguistic codes. Drucker takes Helen Douglas and Tegler Stokes’ collaborative work, Real Fiction, to be an example of meta-production of meaning inherent to 20th century artists’ books. 

Drucker is interested in how Real Fiction calls attention to and exploits features of its concrete and conceptual properties. She describes how the Real Fiction’s sequential visual and verbal openings alternate as the book’s printed images gradually transform from a photographic representation of a book into an image of a rural house that is in the process of being rebuilt. “The photographs begin with an image of an open book, exactly the size and shape of the actual book (thus creating the illusion of staring into a half a dozen page openings) while the text suggestively weaves together themes of architecture (‘threshold’ and ‘door’) with metaphors of a spatialized narrative of interrelations.” Drucker asserts that the use of the graphic to create a representation of the bibliographic makes the interplay of representation of ‘real’ referred to in the title into an investigation of the book as a space of illusion. The pages that have been the image of a material support become a structural form, while the type of the alternating pages appears to float above the paper, casting a shadow downward. The illusion of space is treated literally, while the literal space of the page is used to support an illusion. The idea of a book as only a representation, a fiction, is rendered ‘real’ through exposing the artifice of bibliographic codes through a meta-representation and deconstruction of such properties in graphic and linguistic terms. 

Drucker discusses how the sequential quality of the codex is exploited in many artists’ books to organize and articulate time and space. Real Fiction, however, utilizes the inherent sequencing of codices’ pages in conversation with Douglas and Stokes’ printed, photographic and typographic elements to illustrate the imaginary space of the codex. In an article in a 1999 publication of Journal of Artists Books, Clifton Meador makes an argument for intensive reading practices of artists’ books. He asserts that “a book is an experience in time (well, most books), and books that ignore the possibilities of narrative miss much of the point of books.”  Meador’s understanding of narrative is essentially synonymous with Drucker’s idea of sequence. However, where Drucker’s discussion of sequence is concerned with the relationship between the artist, print, and the bibliographic, Meador makes use of the word ‘narrative’ to more overtly bring the reader into this relationship. The book artist can be preoccupied with structure, with materiality. Readers of artists’ books, however, will have a more linear, temporal experience of structure as they search for meaning from the book, transforming the book’s designed structure into an expressive and meaningful narrative through readers’ interpretative processes. By using the word narrative as opposed to the word structure, Meador indicates that his creative processes give weight to and find value in both authorial-artistic intentionality and reader experience and interpretation.

To the reader in this artist-print-material-audience relationship, structure becomes narrative through the accretion of experience that is the engagement with a book’s print and structure over time. Meador asserts that many traditional bibliographic properties of the book are enough to make an engaging media. Yet, he additionally notes, writing from his experience with making artists’ books, that each little image, each bit of text, every juxtaposition adds to the total. And with each small addition, the reading, and thus the meaning, of a book shifts. Drucker argues that artists’ books’ use of the Book as medium, as opposed to a digital medium or a medium more traditionally connotated with art as opposed to craft, places meaning in the physicality of the book. She contends that this meaning is inherent to and latent within book making processes and the Book-object. 

This idea that expression and meaning can be subconsciously transmitted to readers because particular visual forms intrinsically are responding to histories of the book and other media finds rejection in Meador’s thought and practices. Meador contends that, similar to Drucker, artists’ books have a self-consciousness to them. He asserts that artists’ books’ self-consciousness should be used to engage and deepen a meta-exploration of what books can be. This quality of the medium can be used most productively when book artists deliberately engage with the textual, graphic, and structural elements of a book’s sequence whilst considering how a reader will transform sequence into narrative so as to find meaning. Artists’ books propose a collaboration between reader and artist in order to make meaning of the codex-object and the history of codices. Meador writes that in order “to understand this kind of book, a book that uses every nuance possible to article a narrative, you do have to read it closely. In this new art of making books it is mandatory to read every word.”

Meador’s thought is reflected in the relationship between print and structure in Memory Lapse. In Meador’s book, most properties seem to be a combination of bibliographic, graphic, and linguistic. For example, upon opening Memory Lapse – following the title page which contains the name of the book, its author, publisher, and a small, blue graphic print of a hammer and sickle amongst a bouquet of fabric and wheat – the reader is confronted with five pages of black and white photographs. Each of these five photographs receives an individual page. Additionally, each page frames its singular photograph with wide, blank margins. The bottom margin is always wider than the top, and the exterior margin is always wider than its interior opposite. These photographs depict monuments of past communist leaders, and in the frame of the second photograph readers see a group of people standing between a monument and a photographer.

The first four of these photographs touch each other when Memory Lapse is closed, however the fifth photograph faces a similarly stark yet different bibliographic arrangement. On this page, one line of type is placed at the bottom of the upper third of the page. The line of type reads “What is a moment? What is it good for?” and draws on the blank quality of the rest of the by including a wider than average space between the two questions. Within the photograph on this page’s opposite, Meador has printed a photograph of a monument erected for Lenin and the Soviet Union. When Memory Lapse is closed, the photographic representation of Lenin in this monumental, sculpture form rests upon one question, and the piece of the monument for the CCCP rests upon another. This unique bibliographic coding makes it appear as if Lenin was an inked surface, and his translated, printed form is the question “What is it good for?” The CCCP symbol appears to be translated into type to read “What is a monument?” In this bibliographic coding, Meador introduces an idea that is central to Memory Lapse. Meador is suggesting that photographic images hold the same linguistic identity as pictographs. Thus, when text appears in Memory Lapse this text is not necessarily linguistic coding, and when non-type print appears in Memory Lapse it is not only bibliographic coding. This idea that Meador represents in his book not only challenges readers’ methods of engaging with the book, but it also complicates methods of analysis used in book studies and book history disciplines. 


3. Text, Image, and the Codex -

 

The reverse side of the page that asks the two aforementioned questions is similarly bare. This page presents to the readers a poem, using the same black, serif type, and is justified on the right side. On the left side, as the lines descend, the width of the text shrinks. The shape of the poem has been designed to resemble an image of a train, which has been printed on the subsequent page. When the book lies open and flat, the poem and the train seem to mirror each other. The widest part of both the poem’s text and the image’s representation of the train draw towards each other at the top of the pages, and pull apart from each other at the bottom. Meador’s design here is clearly intentional. Similar to the juxtaposition and bibliographic organization of the two questions and the printed image of Meador’s photograph of the monuments, this poem appears to be an imprint of the subject of the train image. The linguistic code of this poem discusses everything that is depicted in the corresponding photograph – the wood, the air, the smoke, etc. However, the bibliographic code is made only to resemble the train. Through this designed parallel, Meador asks the reader to consider photographs to be possessive of expressive language. 

Roland Barthes speaks to Meador’s notion of a relationship between written-verbal language and a language of photographs. Barthes notes that, despite the lack of a structural study of this relationship, a frequently noticed relationship between text and image has existed since the advent of illustrated books. Yet the question remains, why is there such frequent linkage between text and image? “What is the signifying structure of illustration? Does the image duplicate certain of the informations given in the text by a phenomenon of redundancy or does the text add a fresh information to the image?” Barthes places image and text within the relationship of signifiers/the connoted and signified/the denoted. He claims that a photograph without linguistic companionship is subject to the proliferation of meaning, whereas text upon an image creates a fixed meaning of such image, intentionally designed by an artist or creator. Barthes coined the term anchorage to describe this function of linguistic codes in their relationship to image. 

In Barthes’ discussion of anchorage, he typically uses images with that feature superimposed or in-frame, photographed text as examples for analysis. Memory Lapse, then, poses a problem. Meador’s text is superimposed atop his image, but this superimposition can never be visible as it only exists when the codex is closed and the pages rest upon each other. Memory Lapse brings into a third component, materiality, into Barthes image-text/signfied-signfier relationships. Drucker and Meador made clear artists’ books the meta-representative element that emanates from the books’ self-conscious exploitations of their forms. The medium is the message of artists’ books. Once we think about the impacts on reading experience and creation of meaning through the self-conscious exploitation of the material properties of the book, we are able to think about the impacts on reading experience and creation of meaning of the graphic medium of photography. The overt, self-conscious exploitation of one medium leads us to critically engage with the latent functions of another. In Memory Lapse, specifically in these pages that juxtapose a print of a poem and a print of an image both with the same subject matter, the consideration of the physicality of medium alters the relationship between text and image. As readers, we understand the relationship elucidated by Barthes exists in Memory Lapse, but, again, we are never given access to this relationship. Considering materiality in the context of Barthes’ ‘Rhetoric of the Image’ illuminates Meador’s deliberate positioning of graphic and linguistic printed codes in relationship to physical, bibliographic codes; Meador’s intentional organization of coding creates another self-conscious, meta-representation of analysis and the relationship between text and image. 

Meador’s placement of the linguistic code on one page and the graphic code another the other exploits the codex’s sequential property, rendering the space between the two pages to be a representation of the viewer. In this space, by looking between these two prints, readers continually confront themselves. Confrontation of the self makes the viewer aware of their relationship to what is being looked at. Utilizing sequence, space, and organization of printed marks, Memory Lapse forces a meta-analytical method of reading. Meador urges the viewer to be aware of how they derive meaning from what is visual, and then he challenges the notion that a photograph has a single subject, which in this case would be the train. The design of the text’s form tricks the reader into looking at the representation of the train within the image, yet when they look at such a supposed subject, they are unable to engage with the majority of what the linguistic code of the type discusses. The type’s bibliographic code mirrors how we normally read photographs, while the type’s linguistic code prompts an alternative form of reading images. 

The linguistic code of the type asks readers to look beyond what they perceive to be important – the image’s subject – and to rather holistically engage with the photograph. Meador similarly suggests this mode of engagement through the bibliographic coding of the train photograph. His notion of the photographic image containing multiple subjectivities finds resonance in Susan Sontag’s reflection on the medium. Sontag notes that, “from its start, photography implied the capture of the largest possible number of subjects. Painting never had so imperial a scope. The subsequent industrialization of camera technology only carried out a promise inherent in photography from its very beginning: to democratize all experiences by translating them into images.” Sontag proposes that the proliferation of images has formed a new visual language. Photographs alter and enlarge our notions of what is worth looking at and what we have a right to observe. She asserts that images “are a grammar and, even more, an ethics of seeing. Finally, the most grandiose result of the photographic enterprise is to give us the sense that we can hold the whole world in our heads – as an anthology of images.” Sontag understands that as images proliferate, they accumulate a social language that is not dependent on any particular gaze. Additionally, the proliferation of images has altered the social worldview. As images now have language, the photograph’s ability to represent many objects renders the image full of expressive subjects. 

Meador’s design choices in Memory Lapse emphasize a multi-faceted engagement with photographs. By juxtaposing a poem shaped like a train with an image of a train on facing pages, Meador not only highlights the interconnectedness of text and image but also leverages the physicality of the book to deepen the reader’s experience. The sequential nature of the codex compels the reader to move back and forth, fostering a dynamic interaction between the visual and the verbal. This design choice mirrors Barthes’ concept of anchorage, where text stabilizes the meaning of an image. However, Meador subverts this traditional anchorage by separating the linguistic and visual codes onto different pages, thereby necessitating a more active and interpretative reading process. Meador allows the photograph of the train to take up the entirety of the page it is printed upon. He gives the reader the space to intensively read the photograph. By excluding margins in the design of this page, the reader begins to lose the concept of framing as an artistic device to dictate the subject or object of an image. With margins, this photograph would be an object or subject of the book. Without margins, what is represented in the book is the book.


4. Why a book? -


Meador’s choice of the Book as the medium for Memory Lapse is a deliberate artistic and theoretical act that transcends mere aesthetic preference, reflecting a deep engagement with the unique qualities that books embody. Unlike digital or static visual media, a book offers a sequential and tactile experience, inviting readers to interact with its content over time and through a personal, material journey. This physical engagement mirrors the process of memory, where the act of turning pages becomes an analogy for how memories are accessed, revisited, and reinterpreted. Meador’s use of the book format allows him to layer text and images in a way that creates a dialogue between them, encouraging readers to explore and derive meaning from their interplay. The book’s materiality—its paper, binding, and cover—becomes a metaphor for the tangible nature of memory, illustrating how physical objects are imbued with personal and historical significance. By leveraging the book’s inherent properties, Meador crafts a multifaceted narrative that challenges readers to consider the complex relationship between memory, history, and the medium through which they are conveyed. Thus, the choice of the Book is not merely a vessel for content but a critical element of the artistic expression, offering a meta-commentary on the act of remembering and the construction of historical narrative.


Bibliography -


Barthes, Roland. “Rhetoric of the Image.” In Image, Music, Text, 152–63. London: Fontana Press, 1977.

Coover, Robert. “The End of Books.” archive.nytimes.com. New York Times, June 21, 1992. https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/98/09/27/specials/coover-end.html.

Drucker, Johanna. “Experimental Narrative and Artists’ Books.” Journal of Artist Books 1, no. 12 (1999): 3–30. monoskop.org/images/2/20/Journal_of_Artists_Books_12_Experimental_Narrative_and_Artists_Books_1999.pdf.

———. “The Self-Conscious Codex: Artists’ Books and Electronic Media.” SubStance 26, no. 1 (1997): 93. https://doi.org/10.2307/3684834.

Levy, Michelle, and Tom Mole. The Broadview Introduction to Book History. Peterborough, Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press, 2017.

Meador, Clifton. “Clifton Meador.” Journal of Artist Books 1, no. 12 (1999): 14–15. https://monoskop.org/images/2/20/Journal_of_Artists_Books_12_Experimental_Narrative_and_Artists_Books_1999.pdf.

———. Clifton Meador - Scripps College Book Arts. Interview by Samantha Shaffer, Hannah Travis, and Natalie Bauer. Scripps College Book Arts, 2019. https://scba.omeka.net/exhibits/show/sp2019_interviews/clifton_meador.

———. Interview with Clifton Meador by Sarah Bodman and Tom Sowden (05/11/08). Interview by Sarah Bodman and Tom Sowden. Book Arts at the University of the West of England, 2018. https://www.bookarts.uwe.ac.uk/pdf/canon/meador.pdf.

———. Memory Lapse. Atlanta, GA: Nexus Press, 1999.

———. “The Small Pond.” Journal of Artist Books, no. 21 (2007): 35–39.

Sontag, Susan. “In Plato’s Cave.” In On Photography, 3–24. New York: Delta Books, 1977.


Headlights


 

Lizard

 


A Dembow Salute

 BOOOOOOM BOOOOOM No sé de problema Traigo yerba buena No sé de problema Traigo yerba buena BOOOOOM BOOOOOOM - That is the sound of New York in the summer, more specifically that is the sound of Dominicanyork summers. The quotation above is from PLEBADA, a Dembow song by Dominican Dembow rapper El Alfa and Featuring Mexican breakout star singer Peso Pluma. PLEBADA’s music video features Alfa and Pluma riding around Washington Heights on motor scooters blasting their song. 

 It was genuinely hard to be in New York last summer and not hear this song at least once a day pumping out of a Honda Odysseys with modified speakers that allowed the song to be played at staggering volumes. There has been near endless discourse on the politics of Dominican “auto sound” (the practice of playing loud music from modified car speakers) culture in New York, with headlines decrying the practice of playing loud music as disruptive and cruel to the NYC public who is undoubtedly trying to sleep at the same time that some Musicólogo (people who practice auto sound) is blasting Dembow or Reggaeton at one in the morning. While I don’t mean to come off as naive as to say that people playing loud music late at night can’t be annoying, I am arguing that brave Dominicanyorker Musicólogos are waging an invaluable fight against gentrification with music and deserve their praise. 

There is deep and important scholarship around the issue of the racialized nature of music listening practices. One pressing example is Professor Jennifer Stoever explains in her book The Sonic Color Line: Race and the Cultural Politics of Listening wherein she argues that in the wake of the murder of Jordan Davis (a black man who was murdered in Florida in 2012 over his refusal to turn down his music) case there has to be a conversation around the politics of public space being considered white controlled. In the introduction to The Sonic Color Line: Race and the Cultural Politics of Listening Stoever writes “Without ever consciously expressing the sentiment, white Americans often feel entitled to respect for their sensibilities, sensitivities, and tastes, and to their implicit, sometimes violent, control over the soundscape of an ostensibly “free,” “open,” and “public” space.”’ These conceptions are even more racialized when Spanish is introduced to the conversation. In his piece Latinos are pressured to speak English but often shamed when they can't speak Spanish Journalist Marc Ramirez makes note of a 2018 incident in which a lawyer berated restaurant staff for not speaking English, this is only an example of the constant occurrence of white people attempting to police sound. 

It is clear from these two examples of the policing of sound that major triggers for white policing of sound are speaking Spanish, loud volumes, and bass-heavy music (In the Jordan Davis case the music that he was listening to was described as “Thumping rap music” in the The Florida Times-Union). Dembow and Reggaeton are right at the intersection of those triggers for white people. This reality of attempting to control sound and make neighborhoods quiet comes to be via gentrification. In her essay Why do Rich People Love Quiet? Novelist Xochitl Gonzalez talks about how Brooklyn is being made quieter by an influx of wealthier (often white) people. In an interview with NPR she says “It's the sense of entitlement, and it's the sense that - the assumption that because there's a temporary discomfort for that person, that multiple people's, like, life at that moment should change for them.” Gonzalez is absolutely right. It is ridiculous for newcomers in a well-established community to attempt to dictate that community's cultural practices. However, I would take it one step further and posit that if people are feeling cultural discomfort with their new neighbors they should leave.

Thank you Musicólogos. You make New York communities richer and act as a hyper-visible front guard to those who would want to see New York turned quiet, polite, rich, and white. To those who have recently moved to New York and find themselves at odds with our city's beloved Musicólogos, I would ask why you want to live here at all? There is no shame or anything that is crazy with not wanting to hear loud music, that in and of itself is perfectly fine. It is beyond me why one would move to Washington Heights, East Harlem, The Bronx, Queens, or most of Eastern Brooklyn if that is the case though. So transplants, before you go yelling at, calling the police on, or in any way harassing your local Musicólogos please gaze into a mirror and repeat after me “I am not entitled to silence, and the world does not revolve around me.” 


The last moonshiner

 


Ecocinema Final

 Miles Horner

STS412: Decolonizing Ecocinema

Elaine Gan

05/19/24

TRANSLATION IN ECOCINEMA: INTERCULTURAL/INTERSPECIES


In The Ecocinema Experience, Scott Macdonald writes, “‘Ecocinema’ … is the inverse of the fundamentally hysterical approach of commercial media … The job of an ecocinema is to provide new kinds of film experience that demonstrate an alternative to conventional media-spectatorship.”(20) Through looking at the qualities of cinema, and determining what is “conventional media-spectatorship,” we can see how “Ecocinema” presents an alternative. Alternatively, we can explore how multimodal methods of communication can help us achieve that alternative, allowing for effective translation between cultures and species.

Cinema, as a medium, lends itself to many interpretations. In Jean-Luc Godard’s Histoiré(s) Du Cinema, he posits that this is due to the nature of the medium of video — it is the closest form of communication we have to how we experience the world. Since it reminds us so much of our reality, we project personal associations and feelings onto it. Quinn Georgiac, in their A Concert in the Rainforest: Sound in Multispecies Ethnography, talks about how audio, when paired with video, can accomplish the same thing, asking, “In what ways can our recordings act agentially, surprising us and reorienting our work? In what ways might they offer new openings that words don’t?” We will think of cinema, or any assembled work of audio and video, as agent — something that can provide us with new orientations and perspectives upon every viewing. This quality of recording, to consistently offer different interpretations, allows cinema to translate cultures; extending beyond language and towards the senses. 

This ability of cinema to translate must have been noticed by early filmmakers since early documentary approaches to film were ethnographic. Movies like Robert Faherty’s Nanook of the North, or Margaret Mead’s Trance and Dance in Bali revolve around a single person visiting a native culture with their camera, recording their rituals and commenting on their lives. These films try to present a single, unified narrative about the particular indigenous group they’re studying, attempting to “capture” their culture, in a manner similar to traditional ethnography. These films are ineffective at communicating that mission and are dangerous in what they do. Scott Macdonald points out in The Ecocinema Experience that our enjoyment of nature through art (and video) invariably contributes to its destruction and transformation (19). Since these things have already been recorded, and are as accessible as reality is, they need not remain. This is how I interpret Nanook of the North or Trance and Dance in Bali – not as accurate representations of the native culture they’re studying, but as “salvage” ethnography, a style of filmmaking that attempted to capture native cultures before they were wiped out. Macdonald might argue that the act of recording expedites this process of destruction and that the tradition of salvage ethnography, therefore, is more aligned with the hegemonic values of colonialism than the values of the colonized people they’re attempting to portray. Importantly, these movies rely almost exclusively on language to communicate information – nothing about the frame is interesting, and the only knowledge communicated is through a disembodied narrator. 

Films like Behemoth by Zhao Liang or Forest of Bliss by Robert Gardener are examples of ethnographic documentaries that, instead of trying to ‘objectively’ capture the culture/experience of the people they’re filming, use multimodal and durational cinematic techniques to encourage multiple interpretations. Both films use sound to their advantage – in Behemoth, it’s to occupy the soundscape and mental state of the workers in the mining facilities the film is situated in. In Forest of Bliss, sound is used as a replacement for language – there are no subtitles, yet the rituals and emotions felt by those within the film are apparent through Gardener’s use of repeated sounds. These films are more successful at situating us within the area they’re studying because they focus on the multiple sensations that video and audio can translate, not a unified or objective narrative. Because these films leave so much room for interpretation, they also give more agency to those they’re studying. To return to Georgiac, recordings act agentially, constantly reorienting the viewer, which, seemingly paradoxically, allows for those featured within these recordings to show more dimensions and meanings, deepening the accuracy of their depiction, and the agency they receive. This is how film can truly translate culture; not through disembodied narrators explaining that culture, but by allowing the camera to occupy the space, and letting the viewer interpret and the actor demonstrate meaning. Forest of Bliss is doubly useful here in how it, through its use of sound as the primary method of communicating information, gives the animals and humans within it similar agency. This shows another aspect of ecocinema in its goal to create new film experiences: the ability to translate multispecies experiences. 

Forest of Bliss, Sarah Christman’s Swarm Season, and Shaunauk Sen’s All That Breathes are all fantastic examples of films that translate multispecies experiences. In Swarm Season, the film’s soundtrack is a continuous ebb and flow of the buzz of bees, reminding us of their presence as we traverse through Hawai’i, showing parallels between human song and bee song, or human architecture and bee architecture. In All That Breathes, Sen masterfully interweaves three stories about the city of Delhi together, all relating to the experience of the kites that fly through the deeply polluted air of the city. The birds are given agency - Sen explores how they are mentally and physically affected by the environmental and social degradation of the city, demonstrating how social and environmental collapse go hand in hand. Both films spend much of their time situating us alongside the animals within the film; showing similarities in our experience. Through this, they demonstrate the falsity of the ideological border between humans and animals, a necessary realization if humans are to overcome the unabashed destruction of the environment that permeates capitalism. 

Compare these multiplicitous, slow-moving films that encourage viewers to occupy multispecies and multicultural perspectives to the most popular form of environmental entertainment: David Attenborough’s Planet Earth. Planet Earth, in form, resembles these early ethnographic documentaries. There’s a disembodied narrator, a soundtrack that’s meant to evoke a specific feeling, and a separation between “wildlife” and “human life” that mirrors the separation between “primitive” and “advanced” cultures. This could be seen as colonial ecocinema, the “pro-environmental narratives shot in a conventional Hollywood manner (that is, in a manner that implicitly promotes consumption)” (20), as Macdonald would say. This is emphasized by how the ultimate point of these documentaries is usually to call attention to our conserved lands, and not to call upon an end to the forces that are endangering those conserved lands. Even in its message, it wants nature and humans to be separate. Ecocinema is more than simply environmental cinema, it’s ecological – an important distinction since it recognizes that humans are a part of the system, not outside of it. Films like All That Breathes show us how entangled our cultural and environmental realities are, while films like Swarm Season challenge human exceptionalism, both in service of looking towards a better future, one where humans, animals, and cultures are not viewed as separate, but as simultaneous. Importantly, this is best communicated through the medium of film with durational and multimodal techniques, since it gives more agency to the actors, both human and non-human, within the film, and more agency in interpretation to the viewer. 


Bibliography:

  1. All That Breathes. Directed by Shaunak Sen, Submarine Deluxe, 2022.

  2. Behemoth. Directed by Liang, Zhao, Grasshopper Film, 2015.

  3. Forest of Bliss. Directed by Gardener, Robert, Documentary Educational Resources, 1986.

  4. Georgic, Quinn. A Concert in the Rainforest: Sound in Multispecies Ethnography | Platypus. https://blog.castac.org/2022/12/a-concert-in-the-rainforest-sound-in-multispecies-ethnography/. Accessed 20 May 2024.

  5. Ginsburg, Faye. “Decolonizing Documentary On-Screen and Off: Sensory Ethnography and the Aesthetics of Accountability.” Film Quarterly, vol. 72, no. 1, Sept. 2018, pp. 39–49. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1525/fq.2018.72.1.39.

  6. Histoiré(s) Du cinema. Directed by Godard, Jean Luc, Celluloid, Gaumont, 1980.

  7. Nanook of The North. Directed by Flaherty, Robert, Silent, Pathé Exchange, 1921.

  8. Planet Earth. Directed by Allan, Doug et al., Nature Documentary, BBC One, Present 2006.

  9. Rust, Stephen, et al., editors. Ecocinema Theory and Practice. Routledge, 2013.

  10. Swarm Season. Directed by Christman, Sarah, Grasshopper Film, 2019.

  11. Trance and Dance in Bali. Directed by Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson, Short, 1952.

  12. Documentary, Nature (Sorted by Popularity Ascending) https://www.imdb.com/search/title/?genres=documentary&keywords=nature