Gheaus & Gender Identity

Cora-Louise Fleming-Benite

PHI 210 - Feminist Political Philosophy 

Anca Gheaus & Gender Identity 

In this paper, I present and argue against philosopher Anca Gheaus’ eliminativist theories on gender identity, presented in her paper “Feminism without “gender identity.”” Ultimately, Gheaus underestimates the extent to which people care about identity, which is evidenced in her inaccurate judgment of what is feasible and in her premature dismissal of the aspirational gender role theory of gender identity.

Gheaus’ Argument

To make her argument, Gheaus cites a definition of feminism that describes the feminist project’s aims as eliminating unjustified gender norms and mitigating, or compensating, the disadvantages generated by these norms. With these aims in mind, Gheaus explains, it is essential to distinguish between justified and unjustified gender norms, so as to determine which norms are to be eliminated. Gheaus defines gender roles as “comprehensive social roles that define, for their occupants, different virtues, vices, social rewards and sanctions, and set expectations about who should perform which kind of socially useful work” (37). She describes justified gender norms as ones that derive from facts about sexual characteristics– these are norms pertaining to, for instance, medical care. Gheaus proposes that, instead of referring to these as justified gender norms, we should instead call them “norms related to sexual characteristics.” 

Gheaus defines unjustified norms as “sui generis gender norms,” explaining that these norms categorize people into gender roles and define the content of these roles. Sui generis gender norms are understood to be bad for several reasons. Gheaus cites the feminist objections to sui generis gender norms, notably that such norms enforce different treatment of people based on their real or perceived male or female sexual characteristics. This differential creates expectations of what it means to be a “good female human being” or a “good male human being,” putting people in boxes and requiring that “our judgment of individuals’ virtues and vices be dependent on the gender role they occupy” (38), creating a double standard. Some norms license behavior that is morally wrong (eg. toxic masculinity), others make an asymmetrical demand for morally praiseworthy behavior (eg that a woman be nurturing, or a man protective), while others pertain to morally neutral behavior. 

Another feminist objection to sui generis gender norms is that they are inegalitarian, as they have, historically, unfairly hindered women: “Their access to important opportunities, their freedom from domination, marginalisation and exploitation, and often their very agency, safety and life have been compromised by gender norms” (38). 

Gheaus objects to viewing sui generis gender norms as wholly inegalitarian by presenting a final issue with these norms: they unnecessarily stunt individuals’ development. She distinguishes this issue with that of inequality in that these norms negatively impact everyone’s wellbeing, including that of men, meaning that “gender norms do not always, and therefore not necessarily, generate a unidirectional system of oppression of women in the service of men’s interests” (38). She concludes, therefore, that these norms are not objectionable because they are inegalitarian. Instead, she describes these norms as objectionable because they limit the development of all people, regardless of gender, preventing them from pursuing a good life free from arbitrary constraints. 

Gheaus also believes that gender identity should be abolished because there is no available definition of gender identity that fulfills every desiderata – features deemed important (outlined by trans writers as well) – of the term. Gheaus lists these desiderata saying that (1) the concept should vindicate trans people’s identification of their own identities, (2) the concept should allow for privileged access to one’s gender identity, (3) everyone should have a gender identity, (4) the concept should sit well with the claim that denying a person’s gender identity/misgendering them is a grave harm, (5) the concept should be such that people have a claim against others to respect gender identifications, and (6) it must sometimes be permissible for various institutions to require information about one’s gender identity. Gheaus then examines 6 different candidate concepts of gender identity: Gender identity1 as (lack of) conformity with behavior and dispositions typical of one’s sex, gender identity2 as (dis)comfort with one’s sexed body, gender identity3 as assigned gender role, gender identity4 as aspirational gender role, gender identity5 as internalised gender norms, and gender identity6 as endorsed gender norms. 

According to a fourth proposal, gender identity is defined as the gender norms that a person wishes that others applied to them – that is, one’s aspirational gender role. “Gender identity4 consists in identification with a social role, and maybe also with others who occupy that role,” (42) explains Gheaus. By this definition, people have authority of their own gender identity, thus fulfilling desiderata 2, as it allows for privileged access to one’s gender identity. Gender identity4 also provides a basis for the importance that trans women place on being included in women’s spaces. Gheaus also outlines several shortcomings for this concept of gender identity. Some people do not want any gender norms applied to them, meaning that some people would lack a gender identity, failing desiderata 3. Gheaus also objects to gender identity4 arguing that, since gender norms, which form the basis of gender roles, are unjustified, one cannot claim a right to a specific gender identity. Instead, we may have a general duty not to categorize others as either male or female. When someone consents to gendered treatment based on their aspirational gender role, this duty may not apply, and they may not be wronged. However, Gheaus argues “consent is insufficient to make the treatment permissible, if holding people to particular sets of unjustified gender norms reinforces the norms and therefore creates negative externalities” (42). Therefore, gender identity cannot justify a duty to treat individuals according to specific gender norms, which should be rejected altogether.

Gheaus addresses potential worries or objections with her view. The first objection Gheaus discusses is one she calls the “feasibility worry.” This objection argues that “the gender aspect of our identities is so foundational that we cannot navigate the social world without it” (46). Gheaus discusses Charlotte Witt’s view that “gender roles are the metaphysical unifier of our social identities and are therefore essential to them” (46), believing that all other aspects of social identity are secondary. This may mean that it would be impossible to make sense of the social world without gender roles. Gheaus counters this objection in two ways, first, by arguing that considering gender as a unifier for aspects of our social identities does not apply to any one aspect of our identity – saying that Witt’s view overstates the extent to which gender is in fact a unique unifier. Gheaus argues that gender may not always be the most important aspect of a person's identity, as its relevance is context-dependent. Using the example of Ana, a Russian serf, Gheaus suggests that different parts of Ana’s identity—being a woman, a serf, or Russian—are emphasized depending on the social situation. To her fellow peasants, she is primarily a woman, to the landowners, a serf, and to people in a foreign country, a Russian. 

Gheaus also counters the feasibility worry by citing historical examples of other identities that were once believed to be essential for understanding and organizing perceptions of the social world, have diminished or become less significant over time (counter 2). Around two hundred years ago, Gheaus explains, many Europeans viewed “nationality” as the primary identity category – or at least one of the most central identity categories. Today, though, we are more easily able to perceive people without relying on nationality. “Possibly the same will be true one day of gender identities,” (47) resolves Gheaus. 

Gheaus addresses a second potential objection, one she refers to as the “desirability worry.” That is to say, without an account of gender identity, therefore eliminating the possibility of clearly defining who is a woman and who is a man, feminism is unable to pursue its aims. “‘Feminism’ is most widely understood as a movement aiming to overcome the oppression of women,” (47) she explains. Readers may worry: without the ability to determine what is a woman, what will become of the feminist project? Gheaus counters this objection by proposing a different definition of feminism, one that doesn’t require agreement on what – or who – a woman is (counter 3). She defines the feminist project as “the elimination of gender norms and the mitigation or compensation of disadvantages generated by such norms” (48), allowing for the furthering of feminist aims without the reliance on concepts of gender identity. 

My Objections

I took issue with Gheaus’ objections to the aspirational gender role theory of gender identity (gender identity4). Gheaus makes a big empirical claim – that treating people, with their consent, according to their aspired gender role reinforces unjustified gender norms and thus creates negative externalities – without citing any evidence. Without substantiation, I find this argument difficult to accept. As Gheaus herself describes, gender identity4 succeeds in many ways in terms of trans inclusivity. Employing a concept of gender identity that is trans inclusive subverts traditional and restrictive notions of gender, therefore asserting that treating someone, with their consent, based on their aspired gender roles, does not necessarily propagate gender norms. Additionally, even if we were to accept Gheaus’ claim, she’s weighing larger social issues about the perception of gender above the personal wellbeing of trans people, which I feel that Gheaus does not have the authority to do, nor has she provided sufficient evidence to make me comfortable with this value judgment. 

I also believe that Gheaus fails to adequately address the feasibility worry. While she is right in that some social identities that were once central to our understanding of the social world have become more marginal, her counter remains largely unconvincing. Yes, in Europe of the 1700s, nationality was a central identity category, but so was gender. Gender cannot be compared to other identities because there has yet to be a historical period, in which it is ignored. It is not as though gender simply happens to be in favor as a method of social categorisation, one that will become marginal in the way that nationality did. Gender has always been central, perhaps anchoring other identities that are central – alongside gender – depending on the context. This also applies to Gheaus’ argument that there is no unique aspect of our identity, metaphysically unifying all of our social identities. It is true that some aspects of our identity are more or less salient depending on context, but gender is different from such aspects in that it remains relevant across contexts. If for instance, an individual immigrated, it is possible that their race or class may become more or less relevant than it was in their original context. In their new context, though, they would remain constrained, defined, or potentially liberated because of gender identity. They will still be subjected to gender norms, and while those may differ from context to context, they remain rooted in their gender identity, whether real or perceived. I accept that my point about the persistent relevance of gender would need far more evidence, and perhaps does not apply when discussing single gender spaces; it is not sufficient to object to Gheaus’ counter. Even so, if gender did become less central to our societal understanding of identity– just as nationality did– this would be a long process, not feasible in someone’s immediate lifetime. As gender remains central, people will continue to be subjected to gender norms. Our concept of gender identity provides a basis for efforts to mitigate this suffering, by, for instance, compelling individuals and institutions to use someone’s desired pronouns, or allowing trans people into gendered spaces, regardless of their sex or perceived gender; it is worth preserving. 

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I pledge my honor that this paper represents my own work in accordance with University regulations /Cora-Louise Fleming-Benite/